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Abstract. The Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) is a map of the human 
body. Like maps of other sorts – including the map-like representations we find 
in familiar anatomical atlases – it is a representation of a certain portion of 
spatial reality as it exists at a certain (idealized) instant of time. But unlike other 
maps, the FMA comes in the form of a sophisticated ontology of its object-
domain, comprising some 1.5 million statements of anatomical relations among 
some 70,000 anatomical kinds. It is further distinguished from other maps in 
that it represents not some specific portion of spatial reality (say: Leeds in 
1996), but rather the generalized or idealized spatial reality associated with a 
generalized or idealized human being at some generalized or idealized instant of 
time. It will be our concern in what follows to outline the approach to ontology 
that is represented by the FMA and to argue that it can serve as the basis for a 
new type of anatomical information science. We also draw some implications 
for our understanding of spatial reasoning and spatial ontologies in general. 
1  The Foundational Model of Anatomy 
The Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) is a computer-based representation of 
the entities and relations which together form the phenotypic structure of the human 
organism [1,2]. It provides a qualitative spatial reference system for the human body 
that is designed to be understandable to human beings and also to be navigable by 
computers. It is intended as a general-purpose resource, which can be used by any 
biomedical application that requires anatomical information, from radiology (in 
supporting automatic image analysis) to pharmacokinetics (in representing the 
pathways of drugs as they are absorbed by, distributed through, metabolized in and 
excreted from the body). 
  The FMA began its life as a classification of anatomical entities called the 
University of Washington Digital Anatomist Vocabulary. In recent years it has grown from a list of terms linked by is_a and part_of relations to a sophisticated spatial-
structural ontology of the human organism at all biologically salient levels of 
granularity, comprehending some 1.5 million statements of ontological relations 
among some 70,000 anatomical universals. The acronym ‘FMA’ is currently used in 
the biomedical informatics community both for this ontology and also for its 
representation in computerized form within the Protégé 2000 frame-based ontology 
editing environment [2,3].  
  We shall argue in what follows that the FMA provides a starting-point for a new 
type of anatomical information science, representing a new application domain with 
potentially valuable implications also for other branches of Spatial Information 
Theory. 
2  Types of Relations 
The FMA relates exclusively to continuant entities (i.e. to entities, such as molecules, 
cells, lungs, which endure through time while undergoing changes of various sorts) 
[4]. The Structural Informatics Group at the University of Washington, which 
developed and maintains the FMA, has itself initiated work on two complementary 
ventures, called PRO and PathRO – for ‘Physiology’ and ‘Pathology Reference 
Ontology’, respectively [5] – which deal with those occurrent processes in which the 
anatomical entities at different levels of granularity participate. Here, however, we 
shall concern ourselves exclusively with continuant entities, which exist at the level of 
particulars or tokens (having determinate spatial locations at each specific point in 
time) as instantiations of certain corresponding universals or types (kinds, classes). 
  We can distinguish a number of distinct types of relations between continuant 
universals which are employed in the construction of an ontology like the FMA [3,6]: 
1)   is_a relations, linking one universal to another (more general) universal in a 
subsumption hierarchy; examples: liver is_a organ,  lacrimal lake is_a 
anatomical cavity  
2)    static physical relations between continuant universals; examples: lobe of 
liver part_of liver, nuclear membrane adjacent_to cytoplasm 
3)   relations between universals instantiated at different stages in the 
development of an organism; examples: zygote derives_from ovum,  adult 
transformation_of child. 
Cross-cutting all of these are distinctions between: 
a)    instance-level relations (such as the parthood relation between your left 
thumb and your left hand), which obtain between instances of anatomical 
universals within the canonical organization of the human body; 
b)   relations involving also non-canonical anatomical instances including 
instances of pathological anatomical universals such as wounded knee or 
amputation stump; 
c)   relations involving entities (implants, food, etc.) imported into the human 
body; d)  relations involving entities (biopsied samples, excreta, etc.) exported from 
the human body. 
The FMA itself focuses on relations of types 1) and 2) under heading a). In what 
follows we expand our scope to include also relations of other types, drawing on 
recent work, summarized in [7, 8], involving not only the FMA’s developers but also 
representatives of other influential research groups in biomedical ontology.  
3  Canonical Anatomy 
The term ‘anatomy’ is used to refer both to anatomical science and to that anatomical 
structure which this science describes, a certain ordered aggregate of material objects 
and physical spaces filled with substances (such as blood) which together constitute a 
biological organism [2]. In the case of the FMA the structure in question is what is 
called the ‘canonical’ structure of the adult human body, whereby the idea of 
canonicity (first proposed for the FMA in [9]) has no analogue in geospatial science. 
For where geospatial maps deal in every case with specific instances (with specific 
portions of the surface of the earth), the FMA deals not with the instances, the 
individual human beings, whose bodily organization has been investigated over the 
centuries with the aid of surgical dissection, radiological imaging and other 
techniques, but rather with a certain (‘canonical’) idealization thereof (actually with 
two idealizations, corresponding to the male and female adult human beings, 
respectively). The FMA, that is to say, is a collection of generalizations deduced from 
the qualitative observations of the normal human body, generalizations which have 
been refined and sanctioned by successive generations of anatomists and presented in 
textbooks and atlases of structural anatomy. One needs to take such an idealization as 
target in a venture like the FMA since the effort to do justice to anatomical structure 
in all its variants and instantiations would, in the absence of such an idealized 
reference frame, give rise to an endeavor of unmanageable complexity.  
4  Boundaries 
A further apparent distinction between the geospatial and anatomical domains from an 
ontological perspective turns on the fact that, where anatomy embraces within its 
purview primarily three-dimensional entities such as cells, organs and whole 
organisms, geospatial ontologies are focused on the (broadly) two-dimensional 
entities that form the surface of the earth. Applications of geospatial reasoning have 
thus far been correspondingly concerned with the movement of objects across this 
surface and with associated questions of land-use, soil-type, forest-coverage, and so 
forth. Closer inspection reveals, however, that both anatomical and geographic 
information sciences must deal with entities in all spatial dimensions. Thus the FMA 
deals not only with material objects but also with both fiat and bona fide boundaries 
of two, one and zero dimensions [10,11], and a geospatial ontology like that which 
underlies the Spatial Data Transfer Standard (SDTS) [12] comprehends not only two- (one- and zero-) but also three-dimensional universals (called ‘entity types’) such as 
fumarole, grave, mount and trough. 
While the FMA deals primarily with material objects and their boundaries, it also 
deals with portions of body substances (e.g. of water, urine, or menstrual fluid) and 
with the body spaces (cavities, conduits) which these occupy [13,14]. GIScience deals 
similarly not only with material geographic objects such as mountains and forests, but 
also with non-material geographic objects (such as valleys and craters) having some 
of the features of containers or conduits. In an extended sense it deals also with the 
substances (above all portions of fresh and salt water) which occupy these.  
Considerable progress has been made on the geospatial side, not only in the 
standardization of geospatial terminology, but also in the development of formal 
theories and tools for both quantitative and qualitative spatial reasoning [15,16, 
17,18,], theories and tools which have since been applied in the biological domain 
[19, 20]. In the geospatial case, the tools in question are applied primarily in reasoning 
about the fixed spatial regions on the surface of the earth with which spatial objects 
can be associated. Analogous tools for region-based reasoning are more difficult to 
develop and apply in the domain of anatomy because of the elasticity of the human 
body as contrasted with the earth as base reference object [4]. (It is an essential 
feature of the heart, for example, that it is constantly in the process of becoming 
spatially deformed.) On the other side, however, geospatial ontology is less advanced 
than anatomy in that it has nothing like the formal sophistication in its treatment of 
ontological relations, and nothing comparable to the coverage, in terms of 
systematicity and number of universals treated, that is manifested by the FMA. Thus 
the SDTS comprehends only some 200 entity types. 
5  The Proper Treatment of Relations in Ontologies 
We can conceive ontologies for present purposes as controlled, structured 
vocabularies  designed to support the integration of data and information deriving 
from heterogeneous sources. An ontology like that of the FMA is structured through 
assertions of the form ‘A relation B’ (where ‘A’ and ‘B’ are terms in the FMA 
vocabulary and ‘relation’ stands in for ‘part_of ’ or some similar expression). Such 
assertions express general statements about the corresponding universals, which 
correspond to the sorts of statements found in scientific textbooks. To link such 
ontologies to reality, however, we need to take account not only of the universals 
described in scientific theories but also of the corresponding instances or tokens 
which we find about us in reality, and this means that we need to deal not only with 
the universal–universal relations commonly treated of in work in ontology, but also 
with instance–universal and instance–instance relations [7]. 
  Thus for example the thesis according to which lobe of liver part_of liver – which 
expresses a universal-universal relation – gets its reference to reality in virtue of the 
fact that it is in part a thesis about instances, to the effect that:  
 
every canonical instance of the universal lobe of liver is a part (in the instance-
level, i.e. in the standard mereological, sense of ‘part’) of some instance of the universal liver. 
 
Note the all–some structure of this assertion, which is copied also in parallel 
universal-universal assertions involving other spatial relations such as adjacency, 
attachment and continuity [5,21]. 
  As already noted, one important distinction between geospatial and anatomical 
spatial reasoning turns on the different roles that universals and instances play in their 
respective map-like representations. On the geospatial side, universals are captured in 
the legends that we find in the corners of maps, legends which can themselves be seen 
as forming miniature ontologies in their own right. In the anatomical side, in contrast, 
universals play a central role, not least in virtue of the tremendous increases in our 
knowledge (for example under the auspices of the Human Genome Project) about the 
ways in which universals on the coarse-anatomical levels are connected to universals 
at level of finer grains, down to molecules. Thus where the question of which 
universals need to be distinguished by an anatomy ontology was once resolved by 
visual inspection, scientific anatomy rests increasingly on empirical research in the 
domain of genetics. The parts of the body demarcated on the basis of phenomenology 
will in the future be acknowledged as genuine anatomical structures only after it has 
been demonstrated that there are structural genes whose coordinated expression in the 
development of organisms of the corresponding types brought forth the relevant 
instances. Hence the FMA in its full version must contain a place also for 
developmental transformations. 
6  Anatomical Entities 
Four upper-level universals of the FMA are: anatomical structure, substance, space, 
and boundary. 
  Anatomical structures are material entities such as organisms, organs, cells, and 
biological macromolecules, which have their own inherent three-dimensional shapes. 
  Body substances are portions of blood, water, urine or cerebrospinal fluid, entities 
which inherit their three-dimensional shapes from whatever are the relevant 
containers. The portion of blood in your right ventricular cavity at some specific time 
has a shape which it inherits from the surrounding ventricle. 
  Body spaces are immaterial anatomical entities (cavities, orifices, conduits), whose 
shape, again, is inherited from the relevant surrounding anatomical structure. They are 
distinguished from spatial regions in that they are parts of organisms, which means 
that they move from one spatial region to another with the movements of their hosts.  
  Anatomical boundaries are distinguished from anatomical entities in the other three 
classes by the fact that they are of lower dimension, and stand in a relation of 
boundary dependence [22] upon some relevant anatomical structure or landmark [6]. 
7  Anatomical Structures 
Mereotopologically speaking, anatomical structures are marked by the fact that they are maximally self-connected, which means that they have their own complete three-
dimensional connected physical or bona fide boundaries. Virtually all anatomical 
structures, however, are connected to neighboring anatomical structures via conduits 
which link the anatomical spaces within them. To take account of this fact we require 
a reading of ‘maximally self-connected’ that allows for corresponding portions of fiat 
boundaries – we can think of these as punctures in their external surfaces whose areas 
are quite small in relation to the corresponding total boundary. (‘Fiat boundary’, here, 
signifies a boundary in a continuant entity which corresponds to no physical 
discontinuity or bona fide boundary in the entity itself, but rather to a delineation which 
is drawn by human beings. [10]) 
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Figure 1. The stomach and its major outlets 
 
  Which small portions of fiat boundaries we can ignore in specifying anatomical 
structures is not a trivial matter. Consider the small portions of fiat boundaries we 
need to allow in delimiting an anatomical structure such as a stomach or kidney (see 
Figs. 1 and 2). The stomach, we might think, would be an unproblematic fiat entity, 
because it is merely a segment of a certain tubular continuum which includes also for 
example the esophagus and the small and large intestines. In some cases we can find 
bona fide landmarks, specific changes within the mucosal and muscular layers which 
form the walls of the relevant cavities, for the drawing of the fiat boundaries which 
extend laterally across the relevant cavity. However, the cases of the stomach and 
esophagus and of the kidney and ureter show that not all anatomical structures, at 
those places on their surface where they are demarcated by fiat boundaries, are 
demarcated by fiat boundaries which are landmarked in this sense.   In the case of the kidney we have an anatomical structure that is separated from its 
surroundings largely by bona fide boundaries and only by small sections of fiat 
boundary, but in such a way that the fiat boundary in question is located in a non-fiat 
entity (the urinary tract) (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. The kidney with vertical bar designating a fiat boundary in 
relation to the arterial and venous systems 
8  Fiat Boundaries and Partitions 
Fiat boundaries come in two types: those which demarcate physical anatomical 
entities (for example the plane of the esophagogastric junction, which demarcates the 
esophagus from the stomach) and those which demarcate anatomical spaces (for 
example the plane of the pelvic inlet, which demarcates the abdominal from the pelvic 
cavity). Our talk of ‘planes,’ here, draws attention to the fact that most anatomical fiat 
boundaries have geometrically regular shapes, just as is often the case in the 
geospatial realm (the borders of Colorado or Manitoba). 
  In addition to anatomical structures in the technical sense of the FMA, we can 
recognize also: 
1.   fiat  parts of anatomical structures (for example the fundus of the 
stomach), which are not complete;  
2.   fiat aggregates of anatomical structures (for example the aggregate of 
the upper and lower limbs), which are not connected themselves. 
The recognition of fiat entities of these sorts allows us to do justice to the fact that one and the same anatomical structure can be partitioned in different ways [23]. The 
stomach can be decomposed in one context into its fundus, body and pyloric antrum 
and in another into its wall and cavity. The FMA sees the former as a fiat partition 
into  regional parts, the latter as what it calls a ‘compositional partition’ into 
constitutional parts [24]. While constitutional parts are genetically determined, 
regional parts – for example the loin or the epigatrium – are defined in part by 
arbitrary coordinates. Even if we remain with bona fide parts, however, then we need 
to acknowledge cross-cutting demarcations. Thus for example the bona fide boundary 
between the gray and the white matter of the brain is cross-cut by the bona fide 
boundaries of the neurons which pass between them.  
9  Connectedness and Continuity 
The body’s component parts are intimately interconnected. Indeed, if we leave aside 
the cells floating free in blood and other body substances, then practically all 
anatomical structures are connected to other anatomical structures through different 
kinds of continuities or junctions.  
  The FMA analyzes the relation of connectedness in terms of three different kinds of 
relations: continuous_with, attached_to (e.g. of muscle to bone) and synapsed_with 
(of nerve to nerve and nerve to muscle – a special type of attachment relation obtain-
ing at the level of granularity of cell parts, axons and dendrites).  
  Two continuants are continuous on the instance level if and only if they share a fiat 
boundary. A continuant is self-connected if and only if any division of the entity 
yields parts which are continuous. The relation of continuity on the instance level is of 
course always symmetric. On the class level, however, this is not the case. To see why 
not, consider the relation between the lymph node and the lymphatic vessel. Each 
lymph node is continuous with some lymphatic vessel, but there are lymphatic vessels 
(e.g. lymphatic trunks such as the thoracic duct) which do not stand in continuous 
connection to any lymph nodes. We thus have lymph node continuous_with lymphatic 
vessel (because for every instance of the former there is some instance of the latter 
with which the former is continuous), but not lymphatic vessel continuous_with lymph 
node.  
  To understand the relation attached_to, consider the junction depicted macroscopi-
cally in Figure 3, which shows a bone and a muscle, the latter consisting of a tendon 
and a muscle belly, and (on a finer-grained level) of collagen fibers, muscle fibers and 
bone matrix. The bone itself is well delimited: it ends where the bone matrix ends. 
The same applies to the muscle fibers which, due to their contractile elements, are 
clearly demarcated from the tendon. But collagen fibers cross all of these boundaries. 
One fiber might overlap with the muscle fascia and the tendon, another with the 
tendon and the bone. Tendon and bone can be separated only by severing the fibers in 
question.  
  Attachment, too, is symmetrical on the instance level. On the class level, however, 
it is not in general a symmetrical connectivity relation. To see why not, consider the 
universals placenta and uterus. Every instance of the former is indeed attached to 
some instance of the latter; not, however, conversely. While the corresponding instances have their own bona fide boundaries, the distal 
tendon comes into intimate contact with that circumscribed area of the bone where 
extensions of its collagen fiber bundles of the tendon (the Sharpey’s fibers in Figure 
3) penetrate the bone and intermingle with collagen fibers in the bone’s own matrix. 
The tendon may thus be separated from the bone only by severing Sharpey’s fibers.  
10 Location and Containment  
In addition to the relations of instantiation (between an instance and a universal) and 
parthood (between one continuant instance and another continuant instance), the FMA 
contains also a treatment of location. To understand location formally, we associate 
with the human body a collection of regions (relative places in Donnelly’s terms [25]) 
and define a function which assigns to each anatomical entity c  and time t  the 
corresponding region r(c, t) which c exactly occupies at t. We can then define the 
relation of location for anatomical instances as follows: [26] 
 c  located_in d at t =def. r(c, t) part_of r(d, t) at t 
where relations picked out in bold  obtain at the instance level. On the level of 
universals we have: 
C located_in D =def for all c, t, if c instance_of C at t then there is some d such 
that d instance_of D at t and c located_in d at t. 
Trivially, by this definition, all parts of anatomical structures are located in the 
corresponding wholes. But there is a second type of location relation distinguished in 
the FMA, which is that of containment. This holds between material anatomical 
entities (body substances and anatomical structures) and the anatomical spaces in 
which they are contained. For example: the right lung is contained in the right half of 
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Figure 3. An anatomical junction the thoracic cavity; a Ca
++ ion is contained in an intracellular space in a heart muscle 
cell.  
  If we move away from canonical anatomy, we encounter cases where, for example, 
a lobe of a liver is removed from a donor and transplanted into a hepatectomized 
patient. There is then an instance of the universal lobe of liver which is for a certain 
time not a part of any instance of liver. However, even when such non-canonical cases 
are taken into account, it still has to be true that every instance of lobe of liver stands 
in an instance-level parthood relation to some instance of liver at some time (more 
precisely still: every instance of lobe of liver stands at the beginning of its existence in 
such a relation to some instance of liver).  
  Two entities may thus be related in terms of parthood only during a certain phase of 
their simultaneous existence. It is for this reason that parthood relations between 
continuants on the instance level must be indexed by times [7]. This is not specific to 
living systems. For example, a screw can be part of an engine and it can then be 
substituted by another, replacement screw. In contrast to artifacts, however, biological 
objects are engaged in a constant exchange of matter with their environment, so that 
many parthood relationships are short-lived. Moreover, the dynamic phenomena of 
matter exchange [27] indicate that there must be relations intermediate between 
parthood and containment, realized for example when you take a bite out of an apple 
(and the relevant portion of apple moves from being part of the apple to being 
contained in you oral cavity). Consider what happens when food is degraded in course 
of digestion into sugars, amino acids and fatty acids. Those portions of such 
substances in the lumen of the stomach are then contained therein, while those that 
have traversed the epithelium are successively parts of epithelial cells and then of 
blood or lymph. 
11 Criteria of Parthood 
An account of the processes in question must accordingly allow for the existence of 
transitions between containment and parthood. How, given the above, are we to 
distinguish genuine parthood from the relation of being merely spatially included 
within (i.e. from the relation located_in as defined above)? Is an embryo part of, or 
merely located in, a uterus? [28] Is a bolus of food part of, or merely located in, a 
digestive tract? Is an oxygen molecule part of, or merely located in, a lung? We here 
offer four kinds of criteria which may be of assistance in answering such questions 
(for further detail see [29]).  
1. Genetics: The parts of the body should be of the same genetic origin as the 
body itself. Thus the embryo, on this criterion, is not a part of the body of the 
mother. This criterion faces problems for example in application to oxygen or 
nitrogen molecules in the body (since these do not have a genetic origin) or to the 
mitochondria found in nearly every cell of the body (which have their own 
DNA). 
2. Sortality: If continuant c is part of continuant d, then c and d must be of the 
right sorts to make this possible (they must instantiate appropriate universals). 
Thus if d is an organism, then it is ruled out that a should be an artifact (e.g., a heart pacemaker, a bullet), or a second whole organism (a symbiont, parasite, 
prey, embryo or fetus).  
3. Life Cycle: Unless this is already ruled out by sortal constraints, we can infer 
from the fact that c is located in d during the whole of the life cycle of d, that c is 
part of d (the right ventricle of the heart is for this reason part of the heart).  
4. Function: We can infer parthood from location, finally, where an object c, 
located in a second object d, has a function whose exercise or performance is 
essential to d’s survival or to the maintenance of d’s proper functioning. The 
functioning of the heart or of the brain is essential for the survival of the whole 
human body in this sense, where a given volume of urine is not essential to the 
survival of the bladder, and hence the urine is not counted as part of the bladder. 
This criterion faces problems for example in application to hair (is hair essential 
to the proper functioning of the human body?) or to the kidney and of those other 
organs supplied to the body in pairs [30]. 
12 Holes and Parts 
A further family of problems connected with the location relation in anatomy turns on 
the fact that the boundaries of the objects with which we have to deal may themselves 
be difficult to specify. Many anatomical objects are sponge-like; they are replete with 
vessels, capillaries, cavities, holes and ducts of various sorts. This is true of all  the 
body apart from the cornea and lens. A clear delimitation of an anatomical object, 
often including reference to a plurality of distinct levels of granularity, is therefore 
essential for making any assertion about location.  
  Is a small object such as a calculus located in a duct inside a gland also located in 
the gland itself, or, in the case when the lumen of the duct communicates directly with 
the exterior, located only in the exterior surrounding space? The answer to this 
question depends on whether we admit spaces as parts of anatomical objects in cases 
such as this. 
  The range of problematic borderline cases connected with surface structures is 
depicted in Figure 4. Of the white and gray volumes falling below the (rough) line of 
demarcation of the surface of the body in question, which are parts of the exterior of 
this body and which are parts of the body itself?  
  Analogous puzzles arise also in connection with spatial discontinuities. Accessory 
spleens such as are illustrated in stylized fashion in Figure 5 can be found in more 
than 10% of the population. This phenomenon can be accounted for in two ways, 
either by admitting one discontinuous object with three parts, or (with the FMA – 
which is generally averse to the admission of discontinous anatomical entities) by 
admitting three distinct objects which collaborate in the exercise of a certain function.  In sum, the specification of anatomical part, location and connection relations, and 
also of the degree of spatial overlap between anatomical structures, is often 
problematic because the relevant spatial extensions are difficult to delimit and because 
the relevant anatomical entities continuously lose and gain parts and continuously 
exchange matter with their environment. It will likely never be the case that we can 
formulate a criterion for parthood that can be guaranteed to yield a determinate 
answer to the question is x a part of y? in every single case. From this some might be 
tempted to conclude that the notion of parthood, at least in the biological domain, has 
an ineliminable element of indeterminacy. We, however, prefer to see the 
indeterminacy as lying rather in our partial knowledge of the relations between the 
corresponding entities in reality. 
Figure 4: Problematic surface structures
Figure 5: Normal spleen (left); accessory spleens (right) 13 Non-Canonical Anatomy 
The FMA is a representation of canonical anatomy, which means that its individual 
variables range over those adult male and female human beings who satisfy the 
generalizations which appear in textbooks of structural anatomy and which conform 
to a pattern repeatedly observed by many generations of anatomists and surgeons over 
several centuries. By appealing to the device of specifying different ranges of 
variables, we can modify the scope of the FMA to represent generalizations belonging 
to the different branches of anatomy, for example to canonical human beings at 
various stages of embryological development, and even to organisms of other species. 
It can allow us also to represent the generalizations governing the anatomical variants 
yielded by the presence of, for example, coronary arteries or bronchopulmonary 
segments, which deviate from canonical anatomical patterns of organization in 
various well-understood ways. We here conclude with some brief and speculative 
remarks on the proper treatment of pathological structures within an ontology like the 
FMA.  
  While the universal colon as it appears in the FMA comprehends only instances of 
normal colons (however the term ‘normal’ is to be defined), if the FMA ontology is to 
serve as a basis also for non-canonical anatomy then it must have the facility to 
extend this range of instances to include also abnormal colons. The resulting 
framework of pathological anatomy might then include assertions such as 
abnormal colon is_a colon; 
colon carcinoma pathological structure part_of abnormal colon. 
Moreover (recalling our ‘all–some’ reading of the class-level relation part_of above), 
we might have: 
colon carcinoma pathological structure part_of colon. 
Every colon carcinoma is part of some colon, even though not every colon has some 
colon carcinoma as part.  
  We might have  
abnormal colon transformation_of colon 
colon with carcinoma is_a abnormal colon 
colon with carcinoma transformation_of normal colon 
where C transformation of D is defined as obtaining whenever C and D are continuant 
universals which are such that every instance of C was also an instance of D at some 
earlier time in its existence [7]. 
14 Towards Anatomical Information Science  
Leaving aside a number of abstract domain-independent treatments of spatial 
structures and relations, the primary focus of the discipline called ‘Spatial Information 
Theory’ has thus far been in the area of geospatial information. We believe however 
that Spatial Information Theory ought also to encompass the theory of spatial properties and relations in other domains, not least because – as we hope to have 
shown in the foregoing – the latter can introduce important phenomena of a kind not 
thus far considered in the literature. 
Because of the special role of the canonical (idealized) human body, and because 
of the complementary special role of variant and pathological anatomic structures in 
anatomical information science, many features of the type of spatial information 
science realized in the FMA will be unfamiliar to those working on spatial 
representation and reasoning in the geographical domain. In cartographic terms, 
canonical anatomy would correspond to a map of an idealized portion of geographic 
reality (an idealized city, say, or an idealized lake or continent). Corresponding to 
actual maps (of actual cities or actual continents) is instantiated anatomy, which 
comprehends anatomical data about actual human beings of a type that might be 
recorded in a clinical record or captured in a radiographic image [9]. Instantiated 
anatomy deals with individual, living, human subjects, but in a way that relies on the 
categories or kinds depicted in canonical anatomy. Practically all of geography is 
instantiated geography and geospatial information science is in consequence 
characterized by the existence of a large mass of spatially referenced instance data and 
of powerful systems for reasoning with this data, combined with a treatment of the 
corresponding universals which is relatively impoverished from the theoretical point 
of view. 
There is also a normative dimension of the discipline of canonical anatomy, which 
has no direct counterpart in the geospatial domain. For while there are healthy and 
unhealthy cities, it is not the case that all healthy cities have a more or less identical 
groundplan. Moreover, the geospatial domain has no counterpart of the contemporary 
evidence-based discipline of medicine, and thus no counterpart of its central organi-
zing discipline of canonical anatomical science (and thus no scientific interest in, for 
example, maps of ideal cities). But for this reason, too, there is no counterpart of 
pathological anatomy in the domain of geospatial science, which is to say: no science 
of the determinate ways in which geospatial entities such as cities or lakes depart from 
some normative (‘normal’) case.  
Thus the SDTS contains within its list of attributes no terms for what we might 
think of as disorders of its entity types, as contrasted with the 900,000 or so terms 
included in SNOMED-CT, the systematized nomenclature of clinical terms 
maintained by the College of American Pathologists [31], a large fraction of which 
refers to disorders. There is no counterpart, either, of the ways in which human 
anatomy can be related to the anatomy of other species as a basis for the detection of 
what may be medically relevant homologies [32]. 
The existence of the FMA means that anatomical information science rests on an 
impressive tool for the treatment of anatomical universals, even though both the 
associated instance data and the tools for reasoning with such instance data are still 
impoverished. Some progress is being made on the side of instance-level anatomical 
information science. Again, however, the problems of elasticity, movement, and 
growth of bodily organs present considerable obstacles to the development of 
corresponding tools for instance-based spatial reasoning [33]. With the development 
of genomics-based individualized medicine, and with associated increases in the 
sophistication of electronic health records and medical image analysis, we believe that 
the imbalance between class- and instance-based anatomical data will in the coming years be gradually resolved. Corresponding tools for representation and reasoning 
with anatomical instance data will thus increasingly be needed [34], and we can 
anticipate that the FMA will play an important role in their development by being 
used in tandem with some of the reasoning tools developed in recent years in the 
spatial domain. 
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